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DRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE BUY-SELL AGREEMENT WITH
EMPHASIS ON ESTATE TAX VALUATION
OF CLOSE CORPORATE STOCK
The value of shares in a close corporation can be fixed for estate
tax purposes by use of a "buy and sell" agreement prior to death.
While this is undoubtedly true, this over-simplifies a complex matter.
At the outset it should be noted that the amount of writing on the
subject of the so-called "buy-sell" agreement and its relationship with
our taxing structure is quite extensive.' The cases, however, litigating
the precise question of their binding effect on the commissioner in
his evaluation for estate taxes are considerably less numerous, particu-
larly at the appellate level. There is practically nothing which has
reached the Supreme Court that is helpful on the question of stand-
ards or guidelines.
While the primary concern of this paper is the close corporation,
usually a family operation whose stock has no ready market, the
points taken herein will almost uniformly be applicable in theory
to similar business interests with no established market value, e.g.,
partnerships.
For the most part this paper will encompass an attempt to survey
and categorize, as narrowly as possible, the requirements for drafting
effective (taxwise) "buy-sell" agreements based on the latest pro-
mulgations of the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter designated
IRS) and the Treasury, together with the latest pronouncements of
the courts and some writers.
Inherently, the problem of valuation of stock in a closely held
corporation is subject to confusion and disagreement. The standard
measure of value for all property for estate taxes is the fair market
value2 "at the time of ... death,"3 and since there is no established
market value for stock in a close corporation, it becomes a matter of
computation ad hoc. On the point of time of measurement and
whether it is the value to the deceased just prior to death or to his
estate, much confusion has existed. The latest pronouncement in this
area comes from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Land,4 where the court held that the point of measurement is to
be the instant of death no matter how fleeting; reasoning, that since
the tax is an excise tax on the transfer, valuation should be at the
time of transfer, and that is the time of death. On the measure of
1 Lovndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 485 n. 40 (2d ed. 1962).
2 Treas. Reg. § 20-2031-2 (1958).
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2031(a).
4 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962).
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value the court said ". . . (V)alue looks ahead. To find fair market
value of a property interest at decedents death we put ourselves
in position of a potential purchaser of the interest at that time."5
In this decision we have, in effect, a reiteration of one fairly well
accepted standard of value: the maximum price realizable by the
estate.6
In valuation of closely held stock, the Internal Revenue Code itself
is helpful only to the extent of specifically providing that in the case
of an unlisted stock a comparison with listed securities of a similar
business shall be considered.7 The Commissioner, however, does
suggest a list of factors to use in determining the proper value, while
recognizing that there can be no general formula applicable to the
many varied situations which arise. See the following: 8
a) The nature of the business and its history;
b) The economic outlook in general and in specific;
c) The book value and financial condition of the corporation;
d) Earning capacity;
e) Dividend paying capacity;
f) The existence of goodwill and like intangiblesi
g) Past sales of stock and size of the block; and of course,
h) The market price of stock in like corporations whose stock is
"freely traded."
It should seem fairly obvious that an estate owning stock in a close
corporation is likely to be taxed on a much higher basis than in case of
listed securities which have a definite value. Experience has shown
the market price on listed securities ordinarily to be much lower
than the theoretical fair market value determined as in case of closely
held stock by an examination of financial data and the usual methods
of valuation.
According to one writer, business interests of no established
market value are particularly vulnerable to overvaluation by "at-
tribution of a fictitious good will to the business based upon a cap-
italization of probable future earnings which reflect the wildest
optimism on the part of the treasury."9
One widely used and reasonably successful method of protection
from such over-evaluation is our "buy-sell" agreement. These agree-
ments in general provide for a sale at death at a fixed figure-
specifically or by formula-and thus hopefully establish a specific
5 Id. at 173.6 United States v. Land, supra note 4; Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d
Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2031(b).8 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 237.
9 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 1, § 18.45.
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value to the estate for tax valuation. Additional obvious advantages
of having such a fixation include: permitting more intelligent estate
planning and the preclusion of costly involvements with the IRS
over the proper valuation. Probably the biggest inducement for con-
tracting such "buy-sell" agreements is the protection of the interests
of the surviving members for the uninterrupted continuance of the
business.
Since the actual influence of "buy-sell" contracts on valuation is
not entirely clear, by reason of the fact that the Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on their effect, drafting one should entail considerable
consideration. In reality, it is fairly certain that with proper planning,
the price fixed under a restrictive agreement can be made conclusive
of value for federal estate tax purposes, and for that matter, for state
inheritance tax purposes.10
In drafting an effective "buy-sell" agreement attention must be
given to form as well as substance, guided by the fact that, whatever
the result, it must be such as will convince the IRS that it was not
intended primarily as a tax dodge.
The various type of possibilities are innumerable; however, for
purposes of discussion may be broken down into three main head-
ings: I, "cross purchase," which is an agreement among the share-
holders exclusively; and II, "entity," which provides for the corpora-
tion itself as the redeeming party; and III, that type which is funded
by insurance." Under each of the first two main groupings there are
four sub-groupings: (a) that agreement which binds the parties
affirmatively to buy and to sell under certain conditions; (b) that
which binds a party to the option of the redeeming party or parties;
(c) the "first refusal" agreement which binds a party, desiring to
sell, to offer first to the redeeming party or parties; (d) that which
binds the redeeming party or parties to buy at the option of the
decedent or his estate.' 2
Types I(a) and II(a), being the most restrictive, are the ones
most likely to succeed in fixing the estate value, all other require-
ments being met.'3 Types I(d) and II(d), being the least restrictive,
are fairly certain not to control value, although they may be of some
weight.14 Types I(b) and II(b), though somewhat less restrictive
1o Page, Setting the Price in a Close Corporation by Buy-Sell Agreements,
57 Mich. L. Rev. 655, 679-84.11 Ibid.12 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 1, § 18.45.
'3 Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); Estate of Orville D.
Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), Acq., 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 5; Lowndes & Kramer,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 488.
14Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 1 at 488.
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than the "a" types, are generally held binding on the commissioner
where other general requiremetns are met.15 The "first refusal" type
agreements, I(c) and II(c), are said to give the most trouble be-
cause the estate may keep the full benefits by refusing to sell.16
Once the type of instrument has been selected, careful consider-
ation must be given to several other areas; the price must be care-
fully fixed; the whole instrument together with all surrounding cir-
cumstances must be made to manifest itself as a bona fide business
arrangement;17 alienation of the stock must be sufficiently restrained;
also, the contract must be the result of a voluntary act of his share-
holder;18 and a provision should be made for goodwill.20
How should the price be fixed? How much differential will be per-
mitted between the fixed price and the unrestricted fair market value?
The issue of price has not been precisely litigated and a formula
can no more be given for its determination than for valuing the stock
without such an agreement. But, although the law as it now stands
is rather indefinite and without limits at either end, the problem of
fixing a price should be studied very carefully, for this sole factor
can determine the whole matter. Certainly the price arrived at must
be accurate, reasonable, fair and probably should approximate the
"fair market value" (although this terminology seems somewhat in-
appropriate for in a sense this price properly restricted is the only
market value or price). More specifically, the contract should not
provide a higher price for inter vivos transfers than the estate can
realize at death;-" and the amount should apparently be the absolute
maximum that the estate could realize from a transfer at the time of
death.22 Virtually all of the recent cases surveyed by this writer
wherein the taxpayer has prevailed, consistently follow these general
guides except that of approximating the "fair market value," if we
take that value to coincide with the commissioner's appraisal. Some of
the agreed prices accepted by the courts recently as conclusive of
value, as compared with the commissioner's appraisal, were: $200,000
15 May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952); Davis v. United States,
5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1902 (D.C. Utah 1960); Angela Fiorito, 33 T.C. 440(1959), Acq., 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 4; cf. United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170(5th Cir. 1962).
16 See Mathews v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. N.Y. 1964); But
see Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936); Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 489 n. 50.
17Treas. Reg. § 20-2031-2(h) (1958).1 8 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 287.
19 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 1, § 18.45.
20 Ibid.
21 Page, supra note 10.
22United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962).
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compared with $257,910;23 twenty-five per cent of the net value of the
assets or $80,540 compared to $322,163;24 a book value of $345,000
compared to $516,000;25 a book value of $182,782 compared to
$301,037;2-" zero compared to $100 per share.27 From a study of these
cases and others, it can only be concluded that whatever differential
exists between the contract price and the commissioner's appraisal
of what would at least otherwise be the fair market value, should be
capable of substantiation in terms of the aforementioned general
guides-reasonableness, accuracy and fairness.
A second area of concern, which is undoubtedly the overriding
control and in which price is an influencing factor, centers around
the requirement that the agreement must at least appear to be a
bona fide business arrangement. The IRS must be convinced that it
was made in good faith to accomplish a legitimate business purpose
and not to escape taxes. Some points to watch, about which the courts
at least comment, are: (1) whether the agreement was at arms
length;28 (2) whether there was equivalent consideration-and this is
usually satisfied by a mutual exchange of like promises with all
parties; (3) whether the relationship of the parties is such as to
negate good faith, i.e., where the redeeming party is the natural
object of deceased bounty, in which case more proof of good faith
may be required.2 9 The net result is that all available circumstances
may, in a close case, be surveyed to determine whether the agree-
ment is bona fide or not.
The third category of concern is the extent of restraint upon the
alienability of the stock, how the parties are bound and to what ex-
tent. This area, to a considerable degree, overlaps the selection of the
type of agreement. In general, as has already been suggested, the
more restrictive the terms and the more binding their extent, the more
likely the agreement is to control the value. In any event at least one
thing is fairly certain-the agreement must bind the parties during
life as well as at death, although there need be no affirmative obliga-
tion to sell during life.30 The agreements accepted by the courts fre-
23 Estate of Orville B. Littick, 81 T.C. 181 (1958).2 4 Davis v. United States, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1902 (D.C. Utah 1960).2
'r Brodrick v. Core, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955).20 Angela Fiorito, 33 T.C. 440 (1959).27 May v. McGowen, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952). The contract price for
transfer of the corporation stock in this case was to be determined by deducting
from the fair market value the proportionate amount of a certain outstanding
debt of the deceased. That proportion exceeded the fair market value.2 8 Estate of Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958).
29 See Davis v. United States, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1902 (D.C. Utah 1960).
3OTreas. Reg. § 20-2031-2(h) (1958); Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 487; United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962).
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quently merely prohibit inter vivos transfers rather than specify an
inter vivos buy-out procedure 3 ' The foundation for this rule which is
specifically set out in Rev. Rul. 59-60, seems best explained by the
court in the Land case:
When a decedent retains complete freedom ... his inaction constitutes
a passive transfer of an interest in the property to the person who stands
to benefit by the limitation on the value of the property passing to the
decedent's heir or legatee.32
It also appears that an affirmative duty to sell must be imposed
upon the estate at the option of the corporation or surviving parties.
This, if absolutely necessary, would effectively eliminate the "first
refusal" types, I(b) and II(b), from the category of "buy-sell" agree-
ments which control valuation.32 The precise reasoning for such rule
is not clear, although recent cases have uniformly followed the rule.
This rule probably stems from the "requirement", as discussed by
some writers and courts,34 that the agreement be specifically enforce-
able.
To date the determination of whether a "buy-sell" agreement
price is binding on the commissioner for estate taxes or not has been
on an ad hoc basis with reference to the aforementioned general prin-
ciples. As a result, the state of the law (taxwise) on this subject,
leaves the estate planner somewhat unsure in many instances. How-
ever, the valuation of stock in close corporations has always been
difficult with or without these agreements. It follows, then, that in
the interest of better estate planning some such agreement should
be worked out wherever possible.
When skillfully done, the chances are better than even that the
value fixed by the agreement will be conclusive and controlling. If
not, consolation can be had in the fact that, at least by virtue of its
very existence, the agreement will tend to influence value. It is a
factor which will be considered in the overall valuation in any event.35
Sidney Clay Kinkead, Jr.
31 Angela Fiorito, 33 T.C. 440 (1959); Estate of Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C.
181 (1958).32 United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1962).
3 Mathews v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. N.Y. 1964).34 Lowdes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 1, at 490.35 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Gum. Bull. 237; Mathews v. United States, 226
F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. N.Y. 1964).
